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Abstract 
Based on behavioral finance theory, this paper takes 22186 observation samples of China's Shanghai and shenzhen 
a-shares from 2007 to 2017 as research objects, try to measure the degree of over-optimistic of management by 
analyzing the tone of listed companies' annual reports, on this basis, the influence mechanism of over-optimistic 
of management on corporate debt financing decisions is investigated, and the heterogeneity is analyzed from the 
property right nature, financing constraints and economic policy uncertainty. The research results show that: First, 
the Python language analysis module is used to analyze the management intonation vocabulary in the annual report, 
and to build a linear model of the management intonation with the actual business operation and future prospects 
of the enterprise, take the residual error of the linear model as the proxy variable of over-optimistic of the 
management, this provides a reliable measurement method for the subsequent theoretical research on over-
optimistic of management; Secondly, over-optimistic of the management will lead to larger scale of new debt 
financing and longer debt maturity structure, which is still true after controlling endogenous problems; Third, when 
property rights are non-state-owned enterprises, financing constraints are more serious and economic policy 
uncertainties are higher, excessive optimism of management has a more significant impact on corporate debt 
financing. From the perspective of behavioral finance, this paper examines the influence of over-optimistic of 
management on corporate debt financing decisions, enriches the relevant theoretical literature on the influencing 
factors of corporate debt financing, and has positive significance for comprehensively understanding the decision-
making process of corporate debt financing. 
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1. Introduction 
Stemed from psychology, over-optimistic means overestimating the possibility of better future prospects and 
underestimating the possibility of worse. As a kind of character trait , excessive optimism is prevalent among 
managers and influences theirs decisions of enterprise operation. The excessively optimistic managers often have 
more optimistic view about future prospects of enterprises, which will have an impact on corporate financing 
decisions. From the perspective of management optimism, we examine the influence of over-optimistic of 
management on corporate debt financing decisions and further enrich the relevant theoretical literature about the 
impact of management traits on the decisions of enterprise operation. Taking a-shares listed companies in China's 
Shanghai and shenzhen as research objects , this paper try to measure the degree of over-optimistic of management 
by analyzing the tone of listed companies' annual reports. On this basis, the influence mechanism of over-optimistic 
of management on corporate debt financing decisions is investigated, which makes the paper have significant 
theoretical and practical value. Our results suggest that: over-optimistic of the management will lead to longer debt 
maturity structure, which is still true after controlling endogenous problems. In addition, when property rights are 
non-state-owned enterprises, financing constraints are more serious and economic policy uncertainties are higher, 
excessive optimism of management has a more significant impact on corporate debt financing.  
The contributions of the paper on theoretical research can be followed. Based on behavioral finance theory, 
we examine the influence of  irrational behaviors of management on enterprises’ debt maturity structure and enrich 
the relevant theoretical literatures on the influencing factors of decisions on corporate debt financing. However 
lots of significant researches were conducted in academia, there are still many black boxes in the research of 
decisions on corporate debt financing to be revealed. From the perspective of the traits of management’s behaviors, 
our results suggest that the excessively optimistic management prefer the debt financing with longer maturity. The 
conclusions in this paper not only have positive significance for theoretical and practical circles to understand the 
endogenous influence mechanism of decisions on corporate debt financing but also provide some ideas for 
regulation to prevent financial crisis. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development  
2.1 Literature review 
Upper echelon theory supports that the heterogeneity characteristics of management will influence their decisions 
on enterprise operation profoundly. There has been abundant literatures on studying the impact of management’s 
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irrational behaviors on business decisions, which  achieved fruitful research results. The current researches about 
the influence of management optimism on business decisions focus mainly on investment decisions and 
information disclosure. Concretely, the first part is investment decision. Excessive optimism of management could 
not lead enterprises to overinvest (Bake and Wurgler, 2012). Furthermore, managers who are excessively 
optimistic tend to invest less on research and development (Michel, 2010). The second part is information 
disclosure. The optimistic anticipation of management will aggravate   companies’ earnings manipulation (Hribar 
and Yang, 2010）. 
The influence factors of enterprises’ debt financing are complex badly, and academia primarily investigates 
the event from internal factors and external factors. Firstly, the internal factors. State-owned enterprises are easy 
to get loans through political resources grasped by them (Faccio et al. , 2006）. In addition, the ability of corporate 
earning responds negatively to the scale of debt financing, consistent with Boyer（2014）. According to the 
research of Hackbarth（2003）, the risk inclination of management will raise enterprises’ asset-liability ratio .So 
does overconfidence (Fan, 2011）. Furthermore, Zhang et al. concluded that overconfident management incline 
to choose debt financing of short-term. Secondly, the external factors. The higher level of financial development 
in a region, the longer maturity of corporate debt financing(Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer, 2013）. Moreover, the 
scale of corporate debt financing is smaller when the economy develops at a high level , consistent with DeBoskey 
and Gillett（2013）. 
 
2.2 Theoretical analysis and research hypothesis 
With the development of behavioral finance and social psychology, the ‘rational man’ hypothesis proposed by 
traditional economics becomes doubtable, and current researches examine the decisions of management in aspect 
of irrational gradually. As the critical trait of irrationality, over-optimistic will have effects on managements’ 
decisions on corporate operation. On the one hand, management will overestimate future investment income and 
underestimate not only future investment risks but the possibility of adverseness when they are excessively 
optimistic. Then, the investment impulsion of management will be stronger, and the scale of investment will exceed 
the need or the optimal. Meanwhile, managers who are excessively optimistic need long-term capital so badly to 
invest in order to avoid the stress of short debt service. Management incline to external financing if internal 
financing cannot meet the needs. Excessively optimistic managers prefer the large-scale and long-term debt 
financing to equity financing because they think the stock price of firm is underestimated frequently. On the other 
hand, excessively optimistic managers often overestimate their abilities. These managers consider they can both 
grasp the opportunities of investment accurately and estimate the return and risk of investment project better 
because they hold stronger professional abilities and richer investment experience. Excessively optimistic 
managers hold they can deal with problems better, even if facing the adverse factors. The raise of management’s 
ability of risk tolerance and level of risk preference is the reason why  management who are excessively optimistic 
incline to the large-scale and long-term debt financing. 
Hypothesis 1: Over-optimistic of management will raise the proportion of firms’ long-term debts . 
 
3. Research design  
3.1 sample selection and data sources  
This paper takes a-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2008 to 2018 as 
research objects, excludes ST companies, companies with missing data, financial industry companies and 
companies with abnormal financial data, and finally obtains the annual observation samples of 22186 companies. 
This paper uses web crawler technology to capture the annual reports of listed companies in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen. Other financial data and corporate governance data come from the CSMAR database.  
 
3.2 Variable definitions 
3.2.1 Explained Variable 
Debt maturity structure(DMS) is defined in this paper as long-term debt/total debt. The higher the value becomes, 
the stronger the enterprise's ability to obtain long-term debt is. At the same time, in order to ensure the reliability 
of the research conclusion, this paper also adopts other measurement methods for reanalysis. For details, please 
refer to the robustness test section. 
3.2.2 Explanatory Variables 
Due to the difficulty of observation and definition of management optimism, there are few relevant research results 
in academia. Recently, the study of management tone in academia provides a new way to measure management 
optimism in this paper. Following Henry. (2013) and Leone (2015) ,we analyze the tone of management in the 
annual report to predict the degree of optimism13.Following Huang et al(2013),the extent of over-optimistic of 
management is the following:  
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Where Optimistic represents the extent of management optimism, POS is the number of  occurrence of optimistic 
words in the company's annual reports, and NEG is the number of occurrence of pessimistic words in the company's 
annual reports. The higher the value of Optimistic is , the higher the degree of management’s optimism is. 
Huang et al(2013) points out that the tone in management's annual reports is a reflection of the company's actual 
operations and future prospects. The management tone should have the linear relationship with the actual operation 
and future prospects of the enterprise as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
=
                    
it it it it it it
it it it
Optimistic EPS EPS Size Lev Growth
ROE Age Loss
α α α α α α
α α α ε
+ + ∆ + + +
+ + + +
                (2) 
Where EPS represents earnings per share, Size represents the size of the enterprise which equals the natural log of 
total assets, Lev is asset-liability ratio, Growth is revenue growth rate, ROE is return on net assets, Age represents 
the listing period and Loss represents weather it is defective dummy variable. Model (3) regression residuals 
represent the extent to which the optimistic tone of the management does not match the actual operation and future 
prospects of the enterprise, which can be used as a proxy variable for Over-Optimistic of the management. The 
higher the residual value, the higher the degree of over-optimistic of the management. Considering the differences 
in actual operation and future prospects of enterprises in different industries and in different years, this paper adopts 
the regression by year and industry to calculate the over-optimistic of the management, and then obtains the 
residuals of the regression model. 
3.2.3 Control variable 
Following Florou and Kosi(2015)、Rodano et al(2016)、Fuller et al(2018),we mainly select the following control 
variables: the size of the enterprise, profitability, growth ability, solvency, cash flow, age, asset liquidity, 
management efficiency, board size, independent director ratio, supervisory and ownership concentration. 
 
3.3 Model Specification 
This paper builds the following test model: 
0 1 2 3 4 5
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12 13
=
           
           1 +
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it it it it
DMS Over Optimistic Size ROE Growth Lev
CF Age Liquidity Turnover Dsize Dir
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χ χ χ χ χ χ
χ χ χ χ χ χ
χ χ ε
+ − + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + + +∑ ∑
        (3) 
Among them, DMSit is the debt maturity structure of company i in year t . If the management is overly optimistic, 
the regression coefficient 1χ  of Over-Optimisticit is significantly negative, which indicates that the more overly 
optimistic the management, the higher the proportion of long-term corporate debt; if the regression coefficient 1χ  
is significantly positive, it indicates that the more overly optimistic the management, the lower the proportion of 
long-term corporate debt. 
 
4. Empirical Results and Analysis 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the main variables in this paper. The average debt maturity structure is 
0.143, which means that 14.3% of the total corporate debt is long-term debt. It can be seen that the financing of 
listed companies in China mainly relies on short-term debt and the debt maturity is short. The descriptive statistics 
of other variables are in line with the actual situation of the enterprise and will not be elaborated one by one. 
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Table 1. Results of Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variable N Mean SD Min p25 Median p75 Max 
DMS 22186 0.143 0.176 0.000 0.002 0.069 0.227 0.728 
Over-Optimistic 22186 -0.001 0.064 -0.151 -0.042 -0.001 0.042 0.156 
Size 22186 21.888 1.309 19.073 20.955 21.743 22.644 25.823 
ROE 22186 0.066 0.140 -0.729 0.030 0.071 0.117 0.527 
Growth 22186 0.211 0.594 -0.629 -0.010 0.101 0.281 4.370 
Lev 22186 0.448 0.225 0.047 0.270 0.440 0.612 1.098 
CF 22186 0.041 0.077 -0.206 0.001 0.041 0.086 0.262 
Age 22186 2.015 0.902 0.000 1.386 2.302 2.772 3.178 
Liquidity 22186 0.568 0.216 0.083 0.414 0.582 0.736 0.971 
Turnover 22186 0.632 0.454 0.048 0.334 0.524 0.787 2.593 
Dsize 22186 2.150 0.204 1.609 2.079 2.197 2.197 2.708 
Dir 22186 0.371 0.053 0.273 0.333 0.333 0.400 0.571 
Ssize 22186 1.262 0.258 1.099 1.099 1.099 1.609 1.946 
Top1 22186 0.354 0.153 0.087 0.233 0.335 0.461 0.758 
 
4.2 Univariate Analysis 
This paper uses the T test and the Wilcoxon Z test to examine the differences in variables between sample groups 
of different degree of management over-optimism. Table 2 shows the results of the univariate analysis. Taking the 
debt maturity structure (DMS) as an example, in the sample with high degree of management over-optimism, the 
average debt maturity structure is 0.147, and in the sample with low degree of management over-optimism, the 
average debt maturity structure is 0.140. It can be seen that the debt maturity structure of the high degree of  over-
optimistic management group is higher than the sample group, and both are significantly positive at the 1% level. 
The above analysis shows that the sample group with high degree of over-optimistic management has a higher 
proportion of long-term liabilities than the management group with low degree of optimism, which preliminarily 
confirms the research hypothesis of this paper. 
Table 2. Results of the Univariate Analysis 
Variable 
High  Low  
T test Wilcoxon Z 
Average Median Average Median 
DMS 0.147 0.070 0.140 0.067 0.007*** 0.003*** 
Size 21.956 21.804 21.833 21.692 0.123*** 0.112*** 
ROE 0.061 0.076 0.071 0.064 -0.009*** 0.012*** 
Growth 0.217 0.109 0.207 0.091 0.010 0.018*** 
Lev 0.456 0.433 0.441 0.451 0.015*** 0.018*** 
CF 0.039 0.043 0.043 0.039 -0.004*** 0.004*** 
Age 1.898 2.079 2.159 2.398 -0.261*** -0.319*** 
Liquidity 0.555 0.569 0.578 0.593 -0.024*** -0.024*** 
Turnover 0.644 0.524 0.622 0.524 0.022*** 0.000 
Dsize 2.151 2.197 2.149 2.197 0.002 0.000 
Dir 0.371 0.333 0.371 0.333 0.000 0.000 
Ssize 1.270 1.099 1.255 1.099 0.015*** 0.000*** 
Top1 0.354 0.336 0.355 0.333 -0.001 0.003 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
4.3 Management over-optimistic and corporate debt maturity structure 
From the empirical test results in Table 3, it can be found that the regression coefficient of the corporate debt 
maturity structure is 0.113, and it is highly significant at the 1% level, which indicates that a one standard deviation 
increase in the management's excessive optimism causes the increase in the proportion of long-term liabilities by 
2.0. The percentage is equivalent to 13.99% of the sample mean. This positive promotion effect is significant both 
economically and statistically. In the regression results of the control variables in Table 3, the regression 
coefficients of the company's size (Size), profitability (ROE), growth ability (Growth), solvency (Lev), and 
operating efficiency (Turnover) are significantly positive, and the listing period (Age) , asset liquidity (Liquidity), 
and board size (Dsize) are significantly negative. This means that enterprises with larger scale, higher profitability 
and growth ability obtain the greater the scale of debt financing and have the stronger ability to get long-term debt. 
The results are basically consistent with the conclusions of the current mainstream research literature on debt 
financing (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010 ; Fan et al., 2012), because debt financing has a lot of financial risks and only 
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large-scale, cash-rich enterprises can repay their debts on time and avoid financial difficulties. 
Table 3. Regression Results of Management Over-optimistic and Corporate Debt Maturity Structure 
Variable DMSit DMSi,t+1 
Over-Optimisticit 
0.113*** 0.107*** 
(4.211) (3.723) 
Sizeit 
0.040*** 0.039*** 
(18.595) (17.045) 
ROEit 
0.025*** 0.052*** 
(2.817) (4.989) 
Growthit 
0.006*** 0.007*** 
(3.113) (3.233) 
Levit 
0.093*** 0.066*** 
(8.974) (5.989) 
Ageit 
-0.123*** -0.138*** 
(-6.602) (-6.924) 
Liquidityit 
-0.007*** -0.007** 
(-2.605) (-2.177) 
Turnoverit 
0.227*** 0.215*** 
(18.702) (16.948) 
Dsizeit 
-0.073*** -0.067*** 
(-14.690) (-13.036) 
Dirit 
-0.009 -0.002 
(-0.732) (-0.175) 
Ssizeit 
-0.009 0.008 
(-0.251) (0.215) 
Top1it 
0.010 0.009 
(1.154) (0.976) 
Constant 
-0.494*** -0.678*** 
(-9.704) (-14.458) 
Year/Ind Control Control 
Adj-R2 0.388 0.358 
N 22186 19170 
Note: * p < 0.10，** p < 0.05，*** p < 0.01; t value in parentheses; standard errors are processed by double 
clustering at the corporate and annual levels 
 
4.4 Robustness Test 
4.4.1 Substituting the measuring method of Explanatory Variables 
This paper uses two ways to re-measure the over-optimism of management: first, we recalculate Optimistic1 by 
using Henry (2006), Price (2012) and so on, and then bring it into the model (2) to calculate Over-Optimistic1. 
The formula for calculating Optimistic1 is shown in model (8). From the robustness test results in Table 4, we can 
see that there is a significant positive correlation between Over-Optimistic and DMS at the level of 1%, and the 
research conclusion has not changed. 
Secondly, design dumb variables of management over-optimism: Dummy. Change Optimistic into Dumb Variable. 
When Optimistic is greater than 0, Dummy is 1, otherwise Dummy is 0. The regression results in Table 7 show that 
the regression coefficient of Over-Optimistic is significantly positive at the level of 1%, which is consistent with 
the previous one. 
4.4.2 Substituting the measuring method of Interpreted Variables 
In this paper, we use long-term debt/total borrowing as the proxy variable of corporate debt maturity structure 
(DFS1it.). The regression results in Table 4 show that the regression coefficients of Over-Optimistic are 
significantly positive at the level of 1% and 5% respectively, which supports the conclusions of the previous study. 
4.4.3 Reselect the samples 
In this paper, we use the model (2) to calculate the degree of management over-optimism. Over-Optimistic is 
negative in 11250 annual observation samples and positive in 10936 annual observation samples. In this paper, 
the annual observation samples with negative Over-Optimistic number are deleted and the regression samples are 
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reconstructed. The regression results in Table 4 show that the regression coefficients of Over-Optimistic are 
significantly positive at the level of 5%, and the conclusions of the study have not changed substantially.  
Table 4  Regression Results of Robustness Test 
Variable 
Replace Explanatory Variables Replace Interpreted Variables Reselect the Samples 
DMSit DMSit DMS1it DMSit 
Over-Optimistic1it 
0.187***    
(4.209)    
Dummyit 
 0.012***   
 (3.978)   
Over-Optimisticit 
  0.064** 0.008** 
  (2.296) (2.178) 
Sizeit 
0.039*** 0.039*** 0.064*** 0.036*** 
(18.448) (19.285) (16.761) (13.117) 
ROEit 
0.027*** 0.027*** 0.074*** 0.048*** 
(2.964) (3.152) (4.555) (3.850) 
Growthit 
0.006*** 0.005*** 0.014*** 0.004 
(3.220) (3.207) (4.230) (1.345) 
Levit 
0.094*** 0.089*** 0.145*** 0.098*** 
(9.119) (9.247) (7.555) (7.292) 
Ageit 
-0.123*** -0.107*** 0.022 -0.151*** 
(-6.588) (-6.147) (0.643) (-5.958) 
Liquidityit 
-0.007*** -0.010*** 0.009* -0.006* 
(-2.664) (-4.445) (1.689) (-1.689) 
Turnoverit 
0.227*** 0.220*** 0.202*** 0.236*** 
(18.705) (19.164) (9.591) (15.351) 
Dsizeit 
-0.074*** -0.073*** -0.109*** -0.077*** 
(-14.713) (-15.805) (-13.291) (-11.191) 
Dirit 
-0.008 -0.003 -0.009 0.005 
(-0.718) (-0.286) (-0.431) (0.330) 
Ssizeit 
-0.009 0.005 0.005 0.069 
(-0.244) (0.136) (0.068) (1.428) 
Top1it 
0.010 0.012 0.016 0.013 
(1.148) (1.443) (1.022) (1.193) 
Constant 
-0.487*** -0.729*** -0.933*** -0.611*** 
(-9.583) (-17.407) (-9.324) (-10.137) 
Year/Ind Control Control Control Control 
Adj-R2 0.387 0.379 0.309 0.384 
N 22186 22186 22186 10936 
Note: * p < 0.10，** p < 0.05，*** p < 0.01; t value in parentheses; standard error is processed by double 
clustering at company and annual level. 
 
5 Research Conclusion 
The existing literature on corporate debt financing is mostly from the corporate characteristics and corporate 
governance level to find the influencing factors, few literature from the perspective of behavioral finance to explore 
corporate debt financing. Behavioral finance theory has been widely used in corporate finance. This paper 
examines the influencing factors of corporate debt financing from the perspective of excessive optimism of 
management. The study finds that the debt maturity structure of enterprises with excessive optimism of 
management is longer, and the above conclusion is still valid after controlling the endogenous problem. 
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